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CASES NOTED
v. McCormack was the authority cited by the court of appeals for the
proposition that the speech or debate clause is not a bar to the action.67
The opinion of the court of appeals concluded with these words of
Judge Cummings:
If these plaintiffs should ultimately prevail in this consolidated
action, members of Congress will not be imperiled in their Con-
gressional functions but will merely have to conduct their future
investigations under a narrower, constitutional mandate. A deci-
sion for plaintiffs here would signify no less respect for a coor-
dinate branch of the Government. . . . Thus permitting this
action to proceed will have no chilling effect on the legislators'
performance of their duties. 8
The case of Powell v. McCormack settled the academic question of
the power of a house of Congress to judge the qualifications of its mem-
bers. This case will have long term effects transcending the decision on
the merits.6 9 The analysis and reasoning utilized to reach the result will
affect any future attempt at congressional discipline,"0 broaden the scope
of judicial review of acts of the legislature, yield a different definition
of mootness, and, at least until Stamler v. Willis reaches the Supreme
Court, provide the major restricted interpretation of the immunities
conferred by the speech or debate clause of the Constitution.
F. LAWRENCE MATTHEWS
ANOTHER JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATION PLACED
ON COURTS-MARTIAL
Petitioner, a member of the United States Army stationed in Ha-
waii, was convicted by court martial of attempted rape, housebreaking,
and assault with attempt to rape. The nature of the crime was purely
"civil," and was committed while the petitioner was off duty, not on a
military post, and not in uniform. After his arrest by civilian police, how-
ever, he was turned over to the military authorities for questioning and
subsequently charged with violations of Articles 80, 130, and 134 of the
67. 415 F.2d at 1370.
68. Id.
69. "I put it to you that the main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it
must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching
judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved."
H. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HaRv. L. REV. 1, 15 (1959).
70. Since all congressional discipline cases will involve a fine, or other continuing punish-
ment, it is likely that any future congressional discipline case will certainly be litigated in the
federal courts to see if the action was constitutional.
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Uniform Code of Military Justice.' He was convicted and sentenced to
ten years imprisonment at hard labor and forfeiture of all pay and allow-
ances, and was given a dishonorable discharge. His conviction was af-
firmed by the Army Board of Review and by the United States Court
of Military Appeals.' The petitioner, at this time a prisoner in a federal
penitentiary, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The court
denied relief.' The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed, holding that courts-martial have jurisdiction over cases in which
the defendant is presently in the military service, even when the crime
is cognizable in the civilian court and the offense occurred while the ac-
cused soldier was on leave away from a military reservation.' The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held, reversed: A court-mar-
tial lacks jurisdiction over a member of the armed forces who allegedly
commits a crime within the territorial limits of the United States which
is neither service-connected nor on a military post, nor against a person
performing any duties related to the military. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395
U.S. 258 (1969).
The history of the American military judicial system begins in En-
gland. By the seventeenth century, the kings were responsible for pro-
mulgating laws to govern the army in time of war. When Charles I at-
tempted to expand court-martial jurisdiction over soldiers and sailors for
certain nonmilitary offenses in time of peace, Parliament intervened and
adopted the Petition of Right of 1627.' This law called for the King to
halt such courts-martial which were contrary to the common law.,
Under the reign of William and Mary, Parliament adopted the Bill of
Rights,7 which vested in the sovereign, as commander-in-chief, the right
1. The articles provide respectively:
(a) An act, done with specific intent to commit an offense under this chapter,
amounting to more than mere preparation and tending, even though failing to effect
the commission, is an attempt to commit that offense.
(b) Any person subject to this chapter who attempts to commit any offense punish-
able by this chapter shall be punished as a court-martial may direct, unless other-
wise specifically prescribed.
10 U.S.C. § 880 (1964).
Any person subject to this chapter who unlawfully enters the building or structure
of another with intent to commit a criminal offense therein is guilty of housebreak-
ing and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
10 U.S.C. § 930 (1964).
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to the
prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature
to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of
which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of
by a general, specific, or summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree
of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that court.
10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964).
2. United States v. O'Callahan, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 568 (1967).
3. 256 F. Supp. 679 (M.D. Pa. 1966).
4. 390 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1967).
5. 3 Car. 1, c. 1.
6. Id.
7. 1 W. & M., c. 2 (1688) ; see F. MArrLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY oF ENGLAND
304-05 (1908).
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to command and the power to enforce and maintain discipline. The sov-
ereign's use of these powers, however, was regulated by the Mutiny Act.'
This act provided for trial by court-martial during peacetime only for
the crimes of mutiny, sedition, and desertion, all of which are military-
connected crimes. All other offenses had to be by "the judgement of his
Peeres and according to the Known and Established Laws of this Realme
.... "' There were later enactments which allowed the sovereign to adopt
articles of war in time of peace for troops stationed in the dominions or
elsewhere outside of England. These acts enabled him to convene courts-
martial as if in wartime.10 The Mutiny Act of 1720" provided for trial
by court-martial for nonmilitary crimes if no request for civil trial was
received by the military from the injured party within eight days.' This
"within eight days" provision was dropped the following year.' 3
During the American Revolution, Congress found itself with an
army and no articles of war to govern it. The British Military Code was
already known to the colonists, and with minor modifications the Con-
gress adopted both the Mutiny Act and the Articles of War which were
then in force.' 4 Among those British articles adopted by Congress in
17761 was one which obligated the commanding officer to deliver an of-
fending soldier to the proper civil authorities when requested.' 6 This ar-
ticle withstood even the complete revision of 1806.1' Even though on its
face this article appeared to have given concurrent jurisdiction to the mil-
itary and civilian courts, the actual practice in England was that civil
courts had exclusive jurisdiction of civil offenses committed by soldiers
during peacetime.' 8 The court-martial had no jurisdiction over a crime
for which the common law or statute provided a punishment.'9 Neither
8. 1 W. & M., c. 5 (1688).
9. Id.
10. Mutiny Act of 1712, 12 Anne, c. 13.
11. 7 Geo. I, c. 6.
12. Id. See also F. WEINER, CIVILIANS UNDER MILITARY JUSTICE 13-14, 245-46 (1967).
13. 8 Geo. I, c. 3 (1721). See also F. WEINER, supra note 12, at 14.
14. G. DAVIS, A TREATISE ON THE MILITARY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 44, 342 (2d ed.
1909) [hereinafter cited as G. DAVIS]. There is a conflict as to which set of articles was
enforced at the beginning of the American Revolution, the Articles of 1765 or 1774. These
articles are substantially the same. See Duke & Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing
Army, 13 VAND. L. REV. 435, 445 n.47 (1960).
15. G. DAVIS at 608 (Rules and Articles for the Better Government of the Troops, 1776,
§ 10, art. 1).
16. Whenever any Officer or Soldier shall be accused of a capital Crime, or of
having used Violence against the Persons or Property of Our Subjects, such as is
punishable by the known Laws of the Land, the Commanding Officer and Officers
of every Regiment, Troop, or Party, to which the Person or Persons so accused
shall belong, are hereby required, upon Application duly made by or in behalf of
the Party or Parties injured, to use his utmost Endeavours to deliver over such
accused Person or Persons to the Civil Magistrate; and likewise to be aiding and
assisting to the Officers of Justice, in apprehending and securing the Person or
Persons so accused, in order to bring them to a Trial.
G. DAVIS at 589 (British Articles of War of 1774, § 11, art. 1). The Article also provides that
any commanding officer not complying therewith shall be dismissed from the service.
17. Act of April 10, 1806, ch. 20, § 1, art. 33, 2 Stat. 366.
18. 2 J. CAmPBELL, LIVES OF TILE CHIEF JUSTICES 91 (1849).
19. A. TYTLER, MILITARY LAW AND THE PRACTICE 0F COURTS-MARTIAL 154 (3d ed. 1814).
1970]
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the British nor American Articles of War had provisions relating to com-
mon-law crimes, such as murder and larceny. 0
A general article provided for trial by court-martial for all noncap-
ital crimes and all disorders and neglects against "good order and military
discipline,"' 21 which were not specifically provided for in the articles. The
most likely construction seems to be that the clause "to the prejudice of
good order and military discipline" applies to "crimes not capital," as
well as to "disorders and neglects. 22 In order for an offense to be cog-
nizable under the general article, it must have a direct impact upon good
order and military discipline.25 Yet, in the United States, there were many
instances when the general article was used by commanding officers to
include any "offense ... affecting, in any material though inferior degree,
the discipline of the command.1 24 Even if some commanding officers did
not recognize the implicit limitations of the general article, the Supreme
Court limited it to areas directly affecting military discipline.25
The Articles of War of 1806 remained essentially unchanged until
1863, when Congress passed the Enrollment Act.26 Section 30 of the Act
provided for court-martial jurisdiction in cases of murder, assault, and
rape in time of war, insurrection, and rebellion. This was the first explicit
extension of military jurisdiction in the United States over nonmilitary
offenses. Coleman v. Tennessee2 was the only Supreme Court case in
which section 30 was in issue. The Court held that such an act was nec-
essary since it would have been absurd to let the invaded state courts try
Union soldiers, 28 and such an article was needed when a marching army
had to dissuade the commission of acts of violence and pillage by its
troops .
29
The Enrollment Act was incorporated in the 1874 Articles of War."0
20. G. DAVIS at 581 (British Articles of War of 1774); G. DAVIS at 618 (American
Articles of War of 1776).
21. G. DAVIS at 601 (British Articles of War, 1774, § XX, art. III) (emphasis added)
G. DAVIS at 618 (American Articles of War of 1776, § XVIII, art. V) ;
All crimes not capital, and all disorders and neglects which officers and soldiers may
be guilty of, to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, though not
mentioned in the above articles of war, are to be taken cognizance of by a general
or regimental court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and
be punished at their discretion. Id.
See also note 1, supra.
22. G. DAVIS at 475.
23. W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 1123 (1920).
24. Id. at 1125.
25. Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696, 698 (1881) stated:
The gravamen of the military offense is, that, while standing guard as a soldier over
a jail in which a prisoner was confined, the accused willfully and maliciously
attempted to kill the prisoner. Shooting with intent to kill, is a civil crime, but
shooting [of] a soldier of the army standing guard over a prison, with intent to kill
a prisoner . . . is not only a crime against society, but an atrocious breach of
military discipline.
26. 12 Stat. 736 (1863).
27. 97 U.S. 509 (1878).
28. Id. at 516.
29. 97 U.S. at 513.
30. Rev. Stat. § 1342, art. 58 (1875).
CASES NOTED
Consequently, the 1806 articles, requiring delivery of military offenders
to the proper civilian authorities, were made inoperative during times of
war or rebellion."'
The Articles of War of 191632 expanded the court-martial juris-
diction to peacetime as well as to time of war for selected noncapital
crimes." The general article also included capital crimes for the first
time, 4 and the military then had jurisdiction over the capital crimes
of murder and rape committed outside of the United States in time of
peace.35
The 1916 articles concerning jurisdiction remained the same until the
enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950. 6 The Code,
although being a great reformation in military law, extended even further
the court-martial jurisdiction over capital crimes by giving courts-martial
power to try cases of rape and murder within the United States during
peacetime.
37
The Articles of War and the Uniform Code of Military Justice were
created by Congress through the power granted to it by article I of the
Constitution.38 Section 8, clause 14 seems to limit the power of Congress
to govern and regulate the land and naval forces in their military roles.
Therefore, the offenses over which courts-martial should have jurisdic-
tion must have some special relationship to the military. All the Articles
of War enacted from the time the Constitution went into effect until the
time of the Civil War supported this limitation in the types of offenses
over which those articles had jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court recognized the limited jurisdiction of courts-mar-
tial, and seems to have kept in mind the objective of article III, section
2, to "preserve unimpaired trial by jury in all those cases in which it had
been recognized by the common law and in all cases of a like nature as
they might arise in the future."3 9 On many occasions, the Court seems
to have looked to both article I and article III, section 2, in determining
jurisdiction. If the case was one which impaired trial by jury and at the
same time did not concern itself with the governing and regulating of the
armed forces, the Court limited the military court's jurisdiction.4
31. Rev. Stat. § 1342, art. 59 (1875).
32. 39 Stat. 650 (1916).
33. Articles of War of 1916, art. 93, 39 Stat. 650, 664 provided:
Any person subject to military law who commits manslaughter, mayhem, arson,
burglary, robbery, larceny, embezzlement, perjury, assault with the intent to commit
any felony, or assault with intent to do bodily harm, shall be punished as a court-
martial may direct.
34. Articles of War of 1916, art. 96, 39 Stat. 666.
35. Articles of War of 1916, art. 92, 39 Stat. 664.
36. 64 Stat. 108 (1950).
37. Uniform Code of Military Justice, arts. 118, 120, 10 U.S.C. 712, 714 (1958).
38. Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696 (1881).
39. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1943).
40. "Every extension of military jurisdiction is an encroachment on the jurisdiction of
the civil courts, and, more important, acts as a deprivation of the right to jury trial and of
other treasured constitutional protections." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 21 (1957) (civilian
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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
In the instant case, after giving a brief historical sketch of the ju-
risdictional limits of courts-martial, Justice Douglas pointed out such
distinctions between article I and article III courts as the constitutional
protection of salaries and life tenure granted to article III judges. He
also distinguished courts-martial from other article I courts by viewing
the former as instruments of discipline rather than of justice.
Justice Douglas' underlying premise seemed to be that military
courts were courts of very limited jurisdiction and that because of their
position as instruments of discipline, any expansion of their jurisdiction
would be a direct threat to those constitutional freedoms which the civil
courts are more likely to protect. He stated that the status of a person
as a member of the armed forces "is necessary for jurisdiction; but it
does not follow that ascertainment of 'status' completes the inquiry, re-
gardless of the nature, time, and place of the offense."41
In most of the cases concerning the jurisdiction of courts-martial,
the test of jurisdiction was one of status, that is, whether the accused
subjected to the court-martial proceeding was a person who could be re-
garded as falling within the term "land and naval Forces.'
1 2
O'Callahan v. Parker," has added another test. After the accused has
been determined to be a member of the armed forces, the next question
is whether the offense which the accused had allegedly committed is one
which is service-connected, or whether it is a civil offense. Courts-martial
have jurisdiction over the former but, since O'Callahan, not the latter.
The instant decision has left an important question unanswered, i.e.,
what constitutes a service-connected offense. Justice Douglas has given
some indication as to the definition of the term,44 but has left the question
open. The tact which the Court has taken may very well lead to future
cases in which "service-connected" offenses will be defined and in which
courts-martial jurisdiction would be limited even further. Even if Con-
gress has expanded the jurisdiction of courts-martial well beyond the in-
tent of the framers of the Constitution, the premise that military law is
primarily an instrument of discipline rather than one of justice is no
dependents of military personnel accompanying them overseas cannot be subjected to
courts-martial jurisdiction). See also Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) (civilian em-
ployees of the armed forces cannot be subjected to courts-martial jurisdiction overseas);
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (courts-martial had no jurisdiction over serviceman after
discharge from the armed services) ; Dunran v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946) (civilians
could not be subjected to martial law after threat of invasion was over).
41. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 267 (1969).
42. Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234, 240 (1960); United States v. Schafer, 13
U.S.C.M.A. 83 (1962).
43. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
44. There was no connection-not even the remotest one-between his military
duties and the crimes in question. The crimes were not committed on a military
post or enclave nor was the person whom he attacked performing any duties related
to the military. Moreover, Hawaii, the situs of the crime, is not an armed camp
under military control, as are some of our far-flung outposts.
395 U.S. at 273.
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longer true. Members of the armed forces had the right to counsel 5 long
before such right was given to the civilian,46 whether he is indigent or
not."7
The criticism that the courts-martial are under direct command in-
fluence because the convening authority appoints both the defense and
the prosecution is also unfair. Actually, such criticism can be leveled at
the civil courts as well; the public defenders, state attorneys, judges, and
even the jury are all paid and "convened" by the same party, the state.
Although it is historically true that courts-martial jurisdiction
should be limited solely to "service-connected offenses," this is not be-
cause they are instruments of discipline rather than justice; a more ra-
tional explanation is that courts-martial, by their very nature, are limited
as to their jurisdiction, as are all courts.
GEORGE A. KOKUS
IMPLIED CONTRACTUAL DUTY OF BANKS NOT TO
DISCLOSE INFORMATION TO THIRD PARTIES
CONCERNING ITS DEPOSITORS' ACCOUNTS
Plaintiffs (depositors) alleged that the defendant bank negligently,
willfully or maliciously, or intentionally divulged information concerning
their accounts to third parties. The third parties then sued the plaintiffs
and enjoined the bank from distributing any of plaintiffs' monies on
deposit, whereby plaintiffs suffered damages equal to the cost of settle-
ment of that suit and attorneys' fees expended in defense thereof. The
trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that
plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a cause of action and denied plain-
tiffs' motion for a rehearing. On appeal to the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, held, reversed and remanded: A complaint which alleges
that a bank negligently, willfully or maliciously, or intentionally divulged
information concerning plaintiffs' accounts to third parties states a cause
of action upon which relief can be granted, upon the theory that the
bank breached its implied contractual promise of nondisclosure. Miloh-
nich v. First National Bank, 224 So.2d 759 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
The relationship existing between a bank and its depositors is gen-
erally considered to be that of debtor and creditor,' and it arises only out
45. Uniform Code of Military Justice of 1950, art. 32, 64 Stat. 118.
46. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
47. United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629 (1967). For further reforms within the
military law see Bellin, The Revolution in Military Law, 54 A.B.A.J. 1194 (1968).
1. See cases collected at 10 Am. JuR. 2d Banks & Banking § 339 n.l (1963).
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